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Human beings increase their productivity by specializing their resources and 
exchanging their products. The organization of exchange is costly, however, because 
specialized activities need coordination and incentives have to be aligned. This work 
first describes how these exchanges are organized in an institutional environment. It 
then focuses on the dual effect of this environment—as with any other specialized 
resource, institutions may be used for expropriation purposes. They enjoy specialization 
advantages in safeguarding exchange but they also make possible new forms of 
opportunism, causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendencies are identified: 
In the legal field, there is a surplus of mandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in 
default rules. Second, courts’ activity is biased against the quasi-judicial role of the 
parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputational assets that 
are badly exposed to opportunism.  
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THE CONTRACTUAL PROCESS 
In all contractual processes, exchanges have to be completed and enforced. 
Contractual completion involves ascertaining the efficient terms of the exchange. 
Enforcement means ensuring that these terms are complied with. Problems arise in 
contractual completion mostly because of lack of information, whilst the problem of 
enforcement is related to informational asymmetries between the parties, which makes 
them prone to opportunistic behavior. 
Information scarcity explains the variety and complexity of mechanisms used to 
complete contracts, i.e. to accurately define the terms and conditions of the exchange or 
the commitments between the parties. This definition can occur ex ante or ex post—i.e. 
before or after the parties become committed to each other. It may be carried out by the 
parties themselves and/or by various social institutions, in particular the legal/court 
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Four types of contractual completion result. In explicit contracts, the parties make 
express provision for a very limited set of the many possible situations which may arise 
and the steps to be taken in each of them. The normative system (customs, usage and 
laws—in essence, norms and rules in the terms used by North 1981) provides the 
parties with a detailed standard contract, filling in many of the gaps left out of their 
explicit contract and predetermining the contract when the legislator considers it 
necessary. Decision-making bodies and rules established by the parties constitute 
relational contracts capable of efficiently solving unforeseen situations. Lastly, the 
judicial system “closes” the contract, providing solutions for all remaining unforeseen 
situations and developing the standard contract through case law. The accompanying 
figure summarizes these possibilities, taking into account also the fact that either one or 
more parties may play a leading role in individual or internal contracting and that 
institutional contracting may be centralized or decentralized.  
Whatever the content of the exchange, the proclivity of individuals to advance their 
interests requires enforcement to ensure they perform their contractual obligations. 
Different enforcement mechanisms require different degrees of observability with 
respect to performance: With first-party enforcement it is the individual in breach who 
will evaluate and sanction his own conduct. Evaluation takes place in relation to his 
own moral code and the sanction consists of a certain psychological suffering which 
takes different forms, related to religious conviction and self-esteem. Second-party 
enforcement is based on verification and sanction by the party suffering the 
consequences of breach, who may break off the relationship with the other party or 




verification by third parties. It comprises centralized systems, such as arbitrators and 
judges, and decentralized systems. The latter include the quasi-judicial activity of other 
participants in the market (breach harming reputation and hindering future contracting) 
and social mechanisms by which human groups ostracize non-performing members. 
These contractual solutions may function as substitutes or complements, both 
horizontally and vertically, in terms of the previous figure.  
In principle, legislation defines facilitating rules under which the intention of the 
parties overrides the provisions of the legal text, which only prevails in the absence of 
relevant private provisions. To this extent, private solutions dominate legal solutions in 
ex ante completion. This situation is most typical in 19
th century codification and also in 
Anglo-Saxon common law.
2 This priority, however, has been inverted in much 
subsequent legislation, particularly in that passed during the second half of the 20
th 
century, in which the proportion of mandatory rules is considerable, even within the 
ambit of commercial transactions. On the other hand, virtually all private ex post 
completion is subordinated to the judicial system, so that it is generally impossible for 
the parties to deprive themselves ex ante of the (not always desirable) possibility of 
appealing against their decisions ex post. For these reasons, rather than 
complementarity among solutions, there is now interference, with institutional solutions 
reducing the scope of individual solutions.  
With respect to substitutions between ex ante and ex post solutions, these are highly 
varied. Firstly, in the private field it may be thought that the more the contract is 
completed ex ante, the less it is necessary to complete it ex post. However, the 
functioning of ex post decision-making bodies and rules makes it more necessary to 




such bodies and rules. In the institutional field, there is a particular interaction: to the 
extent that litigation leads to case law, ex ante completion is developed to a greater 
extent and can be expected to reduce recourse to litigation. 
In summary, parties contract within a sophisticated environment made up of the 
market, the law, and social and moral constraints. This institutional dimension is not a 
complement but the main feature of the contractual process and there are substantial 
substitutions and complementarities between most elements of the contractual process.
3 
The rest of the chapter will set aside moral and social solutions and focus on those 
mechanisms for which political actions are more important. This abstraction of moral 
and social mechanisms makes more sense now than at earlier stages of development 
because, throughout history, institutional solutions have become increasingly 
specialized. For example, the separation of Church and State required differentiation 
between moral and legal solutions. The same happened later with the separation of the 
legislative, judicial and executive powers of the State.  
EX ANTE LEGAL COMPLETION 
Irrespective of the degree of detail that the parties introduce when contracting, the 
content and terms of the exchange are further defined by the series of rules and norms 
in force in the field in which the contracting occurs. When it takes place in an 
institutional environment of a legal nature, exchanges are carried out in accordance with 
a very extensive contract, even though the parties themselves only expressly agree on 
the most basic elements of the exchange. Thanks to this legal support, the parties do not 




adapt the standard contract, of great complexity and scope, which the institutional 
environment both explicitly (by legislation and case law) and implicitly (by conflict 
solution mechanisms, including litigation) provides for them. These institutional tools 
enable most exchanges to be completed effectively. The cost of contracting is thus 
considerably reduced and the parties use highly detailed contracts without having to 
write them down or even being aware of them. In other words, the cost of writing 
contracts defining the content of the exchange is reduced because contracts are written 
in an institutional framework established by the law and ancillary institutions, not in a 
direct one-to-one relationship between the parties. 
Legal completion can thus be seen as a rationalization mechanism. The rationality of 
the parties is bounded when contracting since the contract is not usually of sufficient 
scope and the parties are not usually in a position where it is worthwhile devoting the 
necessary resources to completing it, not even to the extent of defining the content of 
the exchange in a series of likely contingencies. This limitation relates to the 
intellectual rationality of the parties and is a direct consequence of individual mental 
activity. By settling for the law, the parties opt to base completion of the contract on 
rationality of an evolutionary type, which has generated the greater and more durable 
part of the law.
4 The parties can thus contract in ignorance, without knowing details of 
the content of their rights and obligations, trusting in the efficiency and good sense of 
their legal definition. (This analysis justifies in efficiency terms the objective of legal 
security so dear to the law, by stressing the necessity that the law and its consequences 
must be easy to predict). 
Certainly, consideration of law as the outcome of evolutionary rationality and, even 




absolute terms. The reason lies in the systematic survival, at least in the short term, of 
inefficient norms originating in the application of an intellectually defective rationality 
or, certainly more frequently, an inefficient collective decision motivated by rent-
seeking activities in the legislative field. In short, although intellectual rationality and 
problems of collective action are important in the genesis of legal rules, their survival in 
the long term constituting a stable legal corpus is, at least in the final instance, governed 
by a logic of competitive adaptation. To the extent that this occurs, we can rely on this 
legal corpus being generally efficient.  
More precisely, two main sources need to be considered in legal completion: 
customary law, including judicial precedent, which is more important in the common 
law tradition, and statutory law, which is more important in the civil law tradition. Both 
sources are closely connected and differences have probably been exaggerated. First, all 
statutory law is a mixture in variable proportions of evolutionary and intellectual 
rationality, with 19th century codified law being mainly the distillation of customary 
law. Second, codified systems of law also benefit from customary law prospectively—
the existence of a code does not eliminate the normative capacity of the courts. In the 
words of Savigny, “codes are not more than geometric dots—jurisprudence draws the 
lines”. It is not even clear to what extent statutory law is more prone to fall prey of 
inefficient rent seeking than confrontational litigation. The balance probably hangs on 
whether the political market or the litigation process is closer to perfect competition.  
In addition, particular forms of legal completion may serve other purposes. For 
instance, codification has been used to prevent judicial opportunism by restricting the 
discretion of the courts. As far as a judiciary is needed for enforcement purposes, a 




courts in an inefficient way. This allows the parties to be relatively free of the risk of 
opportunistic litigation, which seems to be more prevalent in common law legal 
systems, especially when courts are allowed to decide on the basis of equity. Certainly, 
civil law codes contain seemingly flexible concepts such as “good faith”, but their 
meaning is usually unambiguously defined in informational or intentional terms. 
Facilitating and Mandatory Rules 
Before discussing the failures of the legislative process, a distinction should be made 
between the roles of the two main types of legal rule, facilitating and mandatory, since 
they often respond to very different logic. Firstly, facilitating or enabling rules can be 
modified at the will of the parties when they state as much in the contract. They thus fit 
fully into the efficient argument, since their purpose is to reduce the cost of contracting, 
providing the parties with a standardized solution to the most typical or common 
problems that arise with different types of contract. On the other hand, mandatory rules 
are binding on the parties who cannot modify or exclude them. Their existence can be 
justified by failings in free contracting, whether such failings lie in the presence of 
external effects or in the irrationality of the contracting parties.  
Although important, the distinction between facilitating and mandatory rules 
becomes blurred and a question of degree when taking into account the implicit 
coercive capacity of facilitating rules. When agreeing on terms, in a situation of 
informational asymmetry between the contracting parties, the latter are not entirely free 
to depart from the facilitating framework since, when trying to do so, they run the risk 




contract itself. A function of the law is to prevent the parties from having to manifest 
their desire to include a particular clause in the formal contract. Such a manifestation 
can often generate mistrust in the party receiving the proposal, because it indicates that 
the person suggesting it has some potentially conflictive characteristics (mistrust, 
informational advantage and, in particular, little disposition to perform). Likewise, 
proposing a clause that varies from the provisions of the enabling legal rule could be 
interpreted as a sign of the problematical contractual characteristics presented by the 
proposer. In these conditions, the facilitating rule to some extent operates as mandatory 
in cases in which it is costly for one of the parties to depart from it. In these cases, and 
to the extent that a substantial proportion of contracting parties are faced with this 
problem, it can nonetheless be expected that contractual usages which avoid the 
problem will develop. The matter is thus of some short-term importance during the 
adaptation period following promulgation of facilitating rules that depart from the 
customary pattern previously established in the corresponding market. 
Excess of Mandatory Rules 
Human creations rarely respond completely to a logic of efficiency, and legislation is 
no exception. Although it is arguable whether the inefficiencies and failings are more or 
less long-lasting, imperfections in the collective decision-making process which 
legislation generates convert it into a useful instrument for rent seeking, and it matters 
little to the beneficiaries that its facilitating purpose is thereby undermined, thus 






In the field of private law, two general types of defect are possible, which translate 
into an excess or deficit of legislation. It will be argued here that excesses and deficits 
tend to affect mandatory and facilitating rules respectively . In both cases, social 
optimization is sacrificed to individual private interests. In the first case, to those of 
contracting parties and, in the second, to those of intermediaries.  
A large number of mandatory rules that govern private contracting are not the result 
of a logic of external effects or imperfect rationality. They respond, rather, to a desire to 
achieve advantages or redistribution of wealth. The most important origin of 
inefficiencies in the legal system surely occurs when some parties to a pre-existing 
contract or series of contracts manage to legalize breach of their obligations by passage 
of a new mandatory rule or Act applied with retrospective effect.  
Assume, for example, that the parties to a lease were completely free to agree on any 
terms as to price and period such as, for example, a fixed rent, long term and freedom 
for the tenant to terminate the lease. These terms are onerous on the lessor and 
therefore, when he asks for higher rent as compensation, the lessee may prefer to omit 
them, agreeing on a variable rent, shorter period and/or payment of compensation if he 
terminates the lease early. It is understandable, however, that after signing leases of this 
type, lessees have an interest in seeing an Act passed which freezes rents or introduces a 
system of minimum periods and will support political intermediaries who achieve this, 
however much such rules may damage future lessees. 
The problem affects not only leases but all types of contract, with examples as varied 
and bountiful as contracts themselves: debtors will want to make it more difficult for 
creditors to collect, minority shareholders will have an interest in increasing the rights 




the right to compensation for dismissal will fight for it to be provided by law, etc. In all 
these cases, the private and social effects are similar. From the private point of view, 
there is a transfer of wealth: one of the parties to the contract obtains a benefit at the 
cost of the other. The most harmful effect, however, is of a collective nature. The 
parties to new contracts will be obliged to use inefficient terms, their inefficient nature 
(absent external effects or a failure in individual rationality) being shown by the fact 
that they were not previously included in contracts. Alternatively, they will devote 
resources to circumventing laws, all of which reduces the value of contracting to both 
parties and ends up by wasting possibilities for productive specialization. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that many dwellings tend to stay empty, the worst risks find it 
difficult to obtain credit, minority shareholders are dispensed with in new companies 
and numerous potential employees remain unemployed.  
The general consequence of inefficient mandatory rules is to raise contractual costs. 
This makes specialization impossible or forces parties to use suboptimal arrangements. 
Most European labor law probably has this effect, forcing firms to disintegrate and 
contract labor through all kinds of commercial law contracts.
6  
Deficit in Facilitating Legislation 
Failings also occur in the legal system as a result of insufficient introduction of laws. 
The origin of the problem is found not so much in the search by contracting participants 
for rents as in the activities of contractual intermediaries, taken in the broad sense.  
The fact that the experts who draw up laws also often provide the services necessary 




services include those aimed at reducing the interpretative rigor of regulatory agencies. 
There may be a radical asymmetry in the incentives of the experts, depending on 
whether the rules are of a facilitating or mandatory nature, since both excess of 
mandatory laws as well as shortfall in facilitating laws could benefit experts and 
intermediaries. This is because both shortcomings increase demand for their services to 
the extent that they facilitate ex ante contracting, which is complementary to mandatory 
laws and substitutive of facilitating laws. An example of this argument is provided by 
some European corporation laws, which have undergone substantial change with a 
proliferation of mandatory rules. This mandatory nature has even entered areas in which 
it is scarcely justified, such as that of private companies. Since this legislation is aimed 
at “closed” companies, which do not sell securities to the public, even the arguments 
based on external effects that are occasionally used to justify the application of 
mandatory rules to “open” companies hold little water. Despite the fact that facilitating 
laws have simultaneously been expanded, the growth in their extent of the latter is far 
removed from that of mandatory legislation. More importantly, there is even further 
removal from the evolution of facilitating laws in those jurisdictions that are 
characterized by a relative lack of mandatory provisions such as, in particular, US 
company law, especially in the State of Delaware. 
Without suggesting a causal relationship, it is worthwhile considering the benefits 
that this normative imbalance between mandatory and facilitating rules can give rise to. 
The surplus of mandatory rules tends to increase the demand for legal services to 
circumvent the letter and even the spirit of the law. Two simple examples are provided 
by the prohibition on multiple voting shares (in force, for instance, in Spain since the 




requires greater outlay on legal services, not just to create the pyramid but also 
recurrent maintenance of the companies that make it up. Also in the field of company 
legislation, rules regarding legal capital maintenance are not only pointless but in many 
jurisdictions are very costly.
7 The relative lack of facilitating laws generates several less 
visible, but perhaps equally important, effects which are based on the fact that the 
parties need to use other solutions to complete their contracts. The demand for legal 
services will therefore tend to increase as such solutions make greater use of explicit 
contracts ex ante or litigation ex post.  
INSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND EX POST COMPLETION 
Parties do not contract in a vacuum, but within a legal system which provides them 
ex ante with standardized provisions. It is also possible for them to have recourse to a 
third party to settle their conflicts ex post. This third party takes two forms: either 
decentralized market judgment, whose force lies in the loss of future contractual 
opportunities, or a judicial system whose power comes from the political monopoly of 
power.
8 Both the market and judges certainly have inseparable completion and 
enforcement functions. Market participants who turn against a seller or a judge who 
issues a judgment firstly define the content of the exchange when there is a dispute 
between the parties and, secondly, act as ultimate enforcers of the contractual 
obligations so defined. Depending on the features of each case, the relative importance 
in their work of the completion function in relation to the enforcement function varies. 
For example, if a lender sues a recalcitrant debtor, enforcement is probably more 




challenging an agreement to distribute the profits obtained by a company, or a dispute 
regarding dismissal of an employee or termination of a franchise agreement will 
probably involve considerably more completion, as in these cases the actual content of 
the exchange as agreed by the parties is less obvious. 
The Courts 
Institutional Optimum 
A large proportion of contractual disputes can be litigated in the courts.
9 These use 
two main mechanisms for completing contracts: 
First, in order to make up for the lack of explicit agreement between the parties, use 
is made of the general provisions laid down by legislation, case law and commercial 
custom through the process of “contractual integration” (Larentz 1958: 112-121). By 
virtue of this process, “contracts…make it obligatory not only to comply with what is 
expressly agreed but also with all the consequences which, based on their nature, 
conform to good faith, usage and the law” (Section 1258 of the Spanish Civil Code, 
taking it as an example of a typical civil law legal system).
10  
Second, a pattern of judicial decision-making tends to be used to fill in gaps in the 
contract. This pattern consists of an implicit inquiry as to the hypothetical will of the 
parties in the case that, under conditions of zero transaction costs, the parties had made 
express provision ex ante, thus filling ex ante the specific gap that the court has now to 
fill ex post. As it is likely that the parties had come to an agreement generating efficient 




hypothetical will of the parties. It is especially in this field that economic analysis can 
help, both in preparing judgments and in interpreting case law.
11 
The fact that the majority of contracts or conflicts never reach the courts does not 
diminish the role of the judicial system. The mere possibility of judicial intervention 
prevents breach: if the parties anticipate the outcome of a judicial decision they will 
tend to come to an agreement or avoid the conflict. In other words, the judicial system 
carries out an enforcement task, not only explicitly, by implementing its decisions or 
judgments, but also implicitly, by encouraging voluntary compliance in anticipation of 
an even more costly judicial decision. 
Inefficient Sentencing  
In principle, the possibility of having recourse to a judge facilitates contracting: by 
resolving conflicts, the judge will ex post fill the gaps which the parties have not 
specified, such that if the judge’s independence is guaranteed and he has coercive 
power (or the judge’s function is allocated to someone with such power), the costly ex 
ante stipulation of terms for the exchange and/or enforcement of its obligations by the 
parties themselves is less necessary. Nevertheless, the efficiency of judicial decisions 
can also be affected by the interests of the participants, including those of the judges 
themselves. When this occurs, the judicial solution may be inefficient and it is possible 
that the parties could more easily contract without the presence of the judicial system. 
Nevertheless, this presence is usually inevitable since the parties are frequently not in a 
position to choose the jurisdiction in which they wish to settle their disputes, and legal 
systems do not usually respect provisions by the parties eliminating ex ante  the 




On this point it is worthwhile pointing out three specific types of failure in the 
judicial system. These are associated with: (a) deficient identification of judicial 
opportunism by the parties; (b) defective consideration of criteria of “material justice”; 
(c) the presence of a possible bias against quasi-judicial action by the parties.  
a) Judicial and arbitration solutions, by which society or the parties authorize a third 
party (judge or arbitrator) to resolve conflicts which arise in exchanges, provide a 
further possibility for non-compliance if the parties are able to manipulate the judge to 
decide in their favor after incorrectly appreciating the merits of the case. A common 
example consists of considering the merits of the dispute and, in particular, the balance 
of compensation between the parties, based solely on the ex post situation, but without 
taking into account that this is often only the outcome of a random event which could 
have led to different outcomes in which the net balance of compensation would have 
been different. The existence of the judge thus motivates the parties to devote resources 
to both bringing about and preventing this manipulation. In many cases the contracts 
themselves are structured to avoid this type of opportunism. Judicial systems also tend 
to incorporate mechanisms aimed at protecting the judge from manipulation and 
ensuring his independence. Whether they achieve this or not is an empirical matter but 
some systematic biases are frequently present.  
b) It is often considered that implementing the ideal of material justice by means of 
judicial decisions comes into conflict with legal certainty and economic efficiency. In 
reality, the consequences are worse. These closely-related principles of certainty and 
efficiency are often not only affected but justice itself is harmed. This often happens 
because, in order to implement individual solutions which are considered just, the very 




when the solution believed just in an individual case favors the weaker party to a 
contract and, as a result, weak parties to future contracts suffer from a reduction and 
worsening of their contractual possibilities and conditions. A case brought by a rich 
creditor against a poor debtor for non-payment serves as an example. If the judgment in 
this type of case takes into account the insolvency or poverty of the debtor, it is perhaps 
resolving an individual problem (at root that of providing the latter with an insurance 
that he perhaps could or could not, depending on the circumstances, have voluntarily 
contracted). Nevertheless, to the extent that it prevents the creditor from collecting his 
debt, it places obstacles in the path of all loan contracts that may be subject to similar 
judgments in the future. As a result, the judgment also harms potential debtors of a 
similar type to the beneficiary of the judgment, who are deprived of access to credit or 
will have to pay additional interest. In this respect, the conduct of the judge is 
inconsistent, since he is acting unfairly, albeit in a general manner, in relation to the 
type of party to whom on an individual basis he is attempting to dispense justice. 
Moreover, this type of judgment motivates judicial opportunism by the parties, who 
will try and place themselves in a position in which justice will favor them. In this way, 
what is described as justice can even conceal simple contractual expropriation. 
c) Finally, centralized judicial systems frequently exhibit a certain bias against ex 
post quasi-judicial activities by the parties, even in cases in which these quasi-judicial 
activities are the result of an ex ante contractual agreement. The parties’ interests lie in 
allocating judicial functions or rights to the party who has the best information and 
incentives to carry out this judicial task. Two sets of motivation are thus configured: 
firstly, with respect to information, the contracting parties who are in a central position 




central position provides them with information as a free by-product of their 
transactions and enables them to make specialist use of all types of resources in these 
informative and judicial tasks. Secondly, with regard to incentives, those parties who 
have a better reputation or who are in a position to provide further guarantees have an 
advantage. In this respect, the size of the undertaking is usually important since it is 
often associated with greater reputational capital. This quasi-judicial action of the large 
undertaking is usually attacked in the strictly judicial field when judges often interpret 
the subject matter of litigation as deriving from greater bargaining power on the part of 
the larger party and not from the ex post exercise of judicial functions contractually 
allocated ex ante. We have found, for example, that car manufacturers are assigned 
rights in relation to their dealers to complete the contract, defining obligations, 
assessing their performance and, as the case may be, penalizing them if they consider 
that they are in breach of their obligations (Arruñada, Garicano and Vázquez 2001). 
This quasi-judicial activity, which is common amongst many franchiser companies in 
relation to their franchisee networks, is essential to control the proclivity of the latter to 
exploit other members, enabling them to provide their customers with uniform service 
quality in disparate locations. This does not mean, however, that size is the only 
relevant variable in terms of asymmetric allocation of quasi-judicial functions, even 
though it is the most problematical in terms of judicial treatment. Informational 
advantages may outweigh an eventual advantage in incentives. This helps in explaining 
why many retailers carry out these quasi-judicial functions, even in their relations with 
much larger, and supposedly better motivated, suppliers (Arruñada 2000). Nevertheless, 
the ex post contractual asymmetry tends to be perceived by some judges as unfair (at 




to monopolize completion and external enforcement activities ex post) and they 
therefore tend to correct it, thus inefficiently restricting the quasi-judicial powers which 
the private contract itself allocates to one of the parties.
12 (Ex ante competition can be 
safely assumed because judicial proceedings rarely refer to lack of competition ex ante).  
To the extent that legislation and judges restrict the parties’ possibilities for 
establishing efficient ex post decision-making mechanisms the contracting parties must 
implement strategies aimed at protecting self-enforcement mechanisms from the 
possibility of judicial intervention. A large part of ex ante contracting serves this 
purpose. This is probably the case with the inclusion of burdensome terms in 
contracts—for example, that repairs shall be to the account of the lessee, using the 
famous United Shoes case (Masten and Snyder 1993). Despite the fact that these terms 
are not normally enforced (en the United Shoes example, the lessor in fact carried out 
the repairs), their inclusion by assigning to one the parties (the lessor) the right to 
evaluate and penalize the degree of performance by the other party of his obligations 
(which allegedly, amongst other variables, included proper use and care of equipment) 
makes them relatively safe from judicial intervention which the latter party may have an 
interesting in seeking ex post.  
The foregoing refers to what is conventionally understood by judicial system. If, on 
the other hand, we use a broader concept, including market activity aimed at punishing 
what is perceived as contractual breach, the parties will also generally be unable to 
avoid judgment of their activities by third parties. For this reason, it is also important to 
take account of the biases that the market may suffer when judging the activities of its 
participants, particularly when property rights in relation to reputation are poorly 




The Judicial Activity of the Market 
We have taken “judicial” enforcement to mean all those enforcement activities in 
which the person assessing the degree of compliance and implementing the possible 
sanction is one or more third parties other than parties to the contract. In this broad 
sense, not only the courts but also the activity implicitly carried out by the market can 
be categorized as judge as a result of the fact that the contracting is almost always 
observed by other participants in the market, who thus obtain useful information for 
their future contracts. When making this assessment they in fact act as judges in 
conflicts which previous contracts have given rise to. This is a decentralized system in 
the sense that the overall decision, equivalent to a judgment, is the result of a 
cumulative series of individual decisions taken independently and generally not at the 
same time by market participants. 
When, for example, a dissatisfied customer reveals his dissatisfaction to someone 
who wants to listen to him, those who listen to him also act as “judge” in the “dispute” 
thus presented since, after accumulating a variable amount of information, they end up 
forming an opinion and making a resulting decision. Their “judgments” take the form of 
comments to other individuals and, in particular, end up turning into purchase 
decisions, both their own and of third parties. On the one hand, the judgment involves 
failing to acquire the product in question from the particular supplier and often 
commenting on the matter in turn, after which the cycle again begins with a new 
potential buyer. On the other hand, a judgment which acquits the producer also, 
although often implicitly, involves a judgment against the litigant, whose reputation is 
thus damaged. In both cases, these gains and losses associated with future transactions 




assessment processes makes it necessary to stress one of the essential functions of the 
institution we call the “market”, that of acting as judge, rewarding and punishing the 
conduct of those involved in it. 
Contractual Enforcement by Organizations and Markets 
In the judicial activity of the market, it is potential contractual partners who in the 
final instance decide on judgments. Nevertheless, a large proportion of the information 
used to make a decision is often produced by organizations more or less specialized in 
this task. It is thus seen how entire sectors of economic activity have the basic function 
of providing information on the situation and degree of past, current and future 
performance of contractual obligations.
13 This is the case with specialists, such as 
auditing firms and those that rate debt securities. Furthermore, this information is 
constantly produced as a by-product of other activities. The most notable example is 
perhaps banks who, even though not specialists, carry out a function of this type when 
they report on the solvency of their customers.  
The role of the market in solving contractual problems does not end with this quasi-
judicial activity. More generally, when the benefits of productive specialization are 
sufficiently high, the market itself generates all types of external enforcement 
mechanisms whose activity, on occasions free of cost to the parties, protects this 
productive specialization in a more or less direct manner. These external mechanisms 
tend either to facilitate internal contractual structuring and monitoring processes or in 
themselves constitute monitoring or guarantee instruments. For example, in the 
relationship between shareholders and the management of a public company with 




Exchange, which provides a low exit cost for dissenters and an indicator of 
management performance, and external competition for corporate control, manifested 
by public take-over bids and other means for gaining control from outside the company. 
In other contractual relationships, not only information producers appear, as mentioned, 
but also intermediaries who specialize in resolving specific problems which arise in 
third party contracts. This is the case with an essential function of banking activity, 
which is to reduce the cost of the relationship between savers and investors. And also 
with expert buyers, who select products and guarantee their quality, from department 
stores to doctors. Or with specialists in enforcing contractual compliance, such as debt 
collection agencies. These examples show that in some cases the person monitoring or 
bonding third party activities is a specialist, generally a firm, which charges for its 
services. In other cases, it is the market itself, as in the case of the market for corporate 
control, whose activities protect the relationship between shareholders and directors of 
all companies with specialized ownership and control, not only those directly affected.  
Assessment of the Market as Judge 
The fact that decision-makers are market participants ensures that they have powerful 
incentives to inform themselves adequately when taking their decisions. For example, 
the buyer of a car has incentives to be informed and, by means of his purchase decision, 
correctly “judge” the prior conduct of manufacturers. There are also substantial 
differences in the type of information which different types of third party responsible 
for completing or enforcing contracts can handle. It is possible that the market is more 
competent than the judicial system when verifying qualitative information.
14 Firstly, the 




particularly in countries with codified law in which the modern judicial apparatus is 
intended to enforce laws rather than facilitate contracts. Secondly, by acting through 
cumulative individual decisions, possible personal biases and variables are less 
pronounced.  
These purely informative aspects are not the only relevant ones, however. The 
production and transmission of reputational information is not free of incentive 
problems, mainly the supply of false information. As a consequence, reputational assets 
may be subject to a certain degree of expropriation through “reputational blackmail”. 
Certainly, this type of opportunistic conduct is automatically limited in that economic 
subjects also have a reputation as informers on the reputation of others and it is not in 
their interests to lose their reputation as informers. If this were to happen, not only 
would their threats no longer be credible but they would also find it increasingly 
difficult to safeguard the quality they receive in their future transactions.
15  
The greatest risk in this area often comes from the misuse or incorrect functioning of 
institutional mechanisms that increase potential damage without any sort of 
compensation. This might arise with certain consumer regulations which allow 
frivolous accusations to be published without any thought for the consequences, and 
with judicial decisions that on appeal are shown to be inadmissible but do not provide 
compensation. Here it is of interest to note that, because of their very size, large 
companies may be at risk from small enemies. This is because they never win their 
cases even if they are in the right. The guilty party is not able to pay compensation and 





The interactions between different contractual solutions have been described, 
considering that parties contract within an institutional environment with laws, courts 
and markets. Laws improve individual parties’ rationality, courts complete and enforce 
contracts, and markets motivate contractual performance. Public intervention is decisive 
in making these institutions more or less effective in their facilitating roles. Several 
perverse tendencies are present, however. In the legal field, there is a surplus of 
mandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Courts’ activity is also 
unduly biased, mainly against the quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. 
Finally, market enforcement is based on reputational assets that are exposed to 
opportunism. The presence of these failings is not surprising. Institutional solutions are 
also part of the specialization and exchange process. They enjoy the advantages of 
specialization in safeguarding exchange but they themselves also incur new costs of 
exchange because the added specialization in laws, courts and reputational resources 
gives rise to new forms of opportunistic behavior.  
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1  This taxonomy is aimed at coping with the variety of solutions and “types of law” 
usually employed, sometimes even simultaneously, in most economic exchanges and 
also the variety of functions of explicit formulation of contract term, along lines similar 
to Masten (2000). It therefore varies from other conceptions aimed at establishing a 





example) and modes of contracting (traditional contract law, neo-classic law with 
exception following the “excuse doctrine”, and forbearance of law), particularly 
Williamson (1991). It also varies from the formulations which emphasize the role of the 
type of applicable law (labor, company) in defining the type of contract and, as a result, 
of economic organization (e.g. Masten 2000). 
2  We refer to “common law” not in the technical sense but as case law, law made by 
judges. It actually constitutes a hybrid in terms of degree of centralization: it has 
evolved through an accumulation of decisions which are decentralized but taken by 
judicial bodies. 
3 In the analysis of contracts, economic theory and part of current law and 
economics tend often to exclude the institutional environment to make problems easily 
tractable, with a substantial loss in relevance. For instance, the literature on incomplete 
contracts pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) tends to consider that enforcement of 
various dimensions of the exchange is fully guaranteed by a judge who simply 
implements the letter of contractual agreements with no intervention in other 
dimensions. A similar criticism can be raised on those approaches which emphasize 
activities of the parties aimed at developing self-enforcement mechanisms (particularly 
Klein and Leffler 1981; Klein 1992, 1996; and Klein and Murphy 1988 and 1997), 
which tend to exclude the role of the institutional environment. 
4  The contemporaneous version of this concept of law was basically developed by 
Hayek (mainly 1960 and 1973, and for a review and summary, 1988). 
5  On the ambiguity of institutional solutions, see North (1990: 59-60).  
6  González, Arruñada and Fernández (1998, 2000) analyzed this issue in 
construction and Fernández, Arruñada and González (1998, 2000) in trucking.  
7  For the case of the USA, Mannig (1990).  
8  On the economies of joining political power, arbitration and enforcement, see, for 
instance, North y Thomas (1971: 788). 
9  Similarly, the parties may opt to submit these disputes to an arbitration mechanism, 
generally led by more or less impartial experts. In both cases, with either judges or 
arbitrators, the decision-makers are centralized, although arbitration constitutes a hybrid 
formula: its appearance and survival are governed by market criteria, but it functions in 
accordance with centralized decision-making patterns. In the field of contractual 
completion, the private production of contractual forms is also located midway between 
market and centralized solutions. 
10 The role of good faith as a general or default provision varies widely in different 
legal systems. It is minor in Anglo-Saxon countries—although in some of them, such as 
Scotland, it had greater importance in the past but is now in decline—and very 
important in Civil Law countries. It is not by chance that this lesser role of contractual 
integration corresponds to the empirical fact that contracts tend to be much shorter in 
Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
11 The hypothesis of efficiency in rules of judicial origin was advanced in the first 
edition of Economic Analysis of Law (1973). Posner (1998: 271-275, 565-653) and 
Cooter and Ulen (1988: 492-499) contain separate inconsistent introductions regarding 
the efficiency of Anglo-Saxon common law and introduce the main bibliographic 
references on the matter. Regarding the efficiency of continental civil or codified legal 





12 The promulgation of mandatory rules with retrospective effect is also generally 
related to asymmetric contracts, whose asymmetry is often used as an argument to 
justify consideration of free contracting as unfair. 
13 Their role could be seen recently in the sudden growth of “infomediaries” who 
grade the quality of electronic commerce operating through the Internet (Peet 2000: 
319) 
14 For an application to the auditing industry, see Arruñada (1999).  
15 Some very “organized” markets are careful in managing the production of parties’ 
reputation. For example, the American Information Exchange used very formal 
evaluation processes to ensure quality (“Information Industries: New Ideas on the 
Block,” The Economist, 14 March 1992: 79-80). More recently, auction web sites, such 
as Ebay, have taken a similar approach to ensure compliance in payments and 
deliveries. 
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